Interview with Denys Gorbach. A Franco-Ukrainian researcher, he teaches at Lund University (Sweden) and is the author of a thesis on the Ukrainian working class. He contributes to the Ukrainian activist website Spilne/Commons.
What is the trade union landscape in Ukraine?
There are two main types of trade union organisations.
Firstly, there’s a galaxy of trade union organisations often called “official” or “traditional”, which are the heirs of Soviet trade unionism. At that time, the union was the left arm of management: it was responsible for ensuring social peace by offering services and gifts whilst doing the work of “human resources management”. This model of unions as “service providers” is that of the Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine (FPU), which had 4.8 million members on the eve of the war, including 1.5 million in education and 0.7 million in public health. Membership in the “official” union, that is, the FPU, remains virtually compulsory in the public sector (civil service, local administrations, education, health, culture, etc.) where the relationship of dependence on the government remains significant; as well as in large industry (metallurgy, agribusiness, extractive sectors, energy) where it’s more about building a balance of power against a private employer. In these sectors, joining the union “naturally” forms part of the hiring procedure. Once hired, one is free to leave the union, but in reality, the “services”, so despised by the most militant trade unionists, are highly valued by workers, who often move from one union to another to maximise their benefits.
Secondly, there are so-called “independent” unions, whose history is rooted in the immense miners’ strike of 1989 that contributed to the fall of the USSR. The largest structure, the Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Ukraine (KVPU), has about one million members, notably miners, but also railway workers, teachers, doctors, caregivers, lorry drivers, etc. Generally, it’s a militant minority, about 10% of workers, often the most skilled, who can afford to wage a permanent struggle against the employer. These “militant” unions oppose the “service provider” unions, but they also cannot devote the entirety of their budgets to strike funds, because even the combative minority demands services and benefits (Christmas gifts, holiday centres, etc.). While “traditional” unions can rely on income from their real estate companies [see below the ETUC declaration on the government bill on the appropriation of these union assets] – which amounted to, for example, half of the FPU’s income before the war – and on employer subsidies at the company level, “independent” unions live solely on their members’ contributions.
What roles do unions play in wartime?
Before the Russian invasion in 2022, the health crisis had already severely reduced the possibilities for activism: it was difficult to go on strike when the company was suffering from the economic fallout of Covid and the risks of being made redundant were higher. Nevertheless, even under these conditions, the independent miners’ union managed to support a major wildcat strike that paralysed the mines of Kryvyi Rih in 2020.
Then, the war came to further degrade the situation of industrial enterprises (those that weren’t physically destroyed), particularly because of the maritime blockade. Added to this are military mobilisation and the government’s anti-social policies, which intensified in 2022. Martial law doesn’t leave much room to fight neoliberal policies. Unions act mainly at the level of disseminating a counter-discourse and building links with labour movements in Western countries. Indeed, it’s pressure from abroad that is currently most likely to shift the lines at the Ukrainian government level.
In parallel, the war has imposed many new missions on unions. Since February 2022, they have been taking care of their members who have gone to the front. A significant part of their resources is devoted to coordinating material aid to trade unionists who have become soldiers. Unfortunately, many of them have died. In these cases too, it’s the union that looks after their families, providing not only material but also legal assistance. Indeed, the union legal service is the closest structure, for example, to help widows establish with public services that the soldier actually died in combat and is not simply missing: without this, they cannot claim state benefits.
Do you have news of trade union activists who still live in territories occupied by the Russian army?
The Donbass trade union movement split in 2014, when separatists aided by the Russian army took control of many territories there. Some activists left these territories; others decided to continue their activities under the new power. But while “official” unions were repurposed, on the previous model of direct submission to political authorities, “independent” unions were simply banned, like all other organisations with an independent militant vocation from power. Since 2015-2016, I have received no information concerning independent militants from Donbass: it’s an extinct species. The 2022 invasion was much more brutal than the Donbass war triggered in 2014. If there was a certain tolerance towards some popular initiatives in 2014-2015, this has completely disappeared with this new war: now, there’s only the army advancing, destroying entire cities in its path. It’s difficult to imagine a union, whatever it might be, in supposedly “liberated” Maryinka or Vovtchansk, where there are no longer any businesses or homes. Mariupol was a workers’ stronghold: today, it’s nothing but a heap of broken concrete.
Is the war pushing unions to engage in more political actions, in favour of greater social transformation?
It’s become a popular refrain in Ukraine: “our guys will come back from the front and restore social justice”. In reality, it’s more complicated. It is indeed possible that trade unionists will return from the war strengthened and united as a political force. But there’s nothing automatic about all this. A lot will depend on how the war ends: a military defeat will strengthen the most reactionary and revanchist forces in the country, while an outcome that would be perceived as a victory by the masses could favour a progressive path.
What can we do in Belgium to support Ukrainian workers and unions?
The efforts already undertaken by the Western left, and particularly by certain unions (notably French), are extraordinary and very useful politically: I’m talking about solidarity convoys, thanks to which Ukrainian workers receive humanitarian aid, but also meet foreign trade unionists and learn the meaning of the word “solidarity” in practice. These contacts are undoubtedly one of the rare positive political consequences of this invasion, because previously, there was no perceived interest in forging such links, especially on the Western side. Today, we have the opportunity to make up for decades of past isolation and build bridges, rather than reproducing the far-right discourse on border protection. In the immediate term, a campaign led by left-wing forces to welcome Ukraine into the European space and to allow it to rebuild through debt cancellation and the transfer of frozen Russian assets would be welcome. Such a campaign would stand out from the narratives of the pro-Russian far-right and the liberals who want to bleed Ukraine indefinitely.
Interview published on 22 April 2025 on the website of the National Employees’ Centre (CNE) of Belgium.
Translated for ESSF by Adam Novak